Limitations of Science as a System of Belief. by Swann Harding, T.
We
OPEN COURT
Devoted to the Science of Religion,
the Religion of Science, and the Exten-
sion of the Religious Parliament Idea
FOUNDED BY EDWARD C. HEGELER
OCTOBER, 1930
-<-
VOLUME XLIV NUMBER 893
•Vrice 20 Cents
955? Open Qourt Publishing Company







and G. WATTS CUNNINGHAM
OF THE SAGE SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY, CORNELL UNIVERSITY
WITH THE CO-OPERATION OF
fiTIENNE GILSON (Paris) GEORGE SANTAYANA (Rome)
ARTHUR LIEBERT (Berlin) A. E. TAYLOR (Edinburgh)
ASSOCIATE EDITOR
HAROLD R. SMART
OF THE SAGE SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY, CORNELL UNIVERSITY
Contents for September, 1930
L Clerselier and Rohault Albert G. A. Bah
II. Notes on the Logic of Grammar V. J. McGill
IIL Beauty and the Good Marjorie S. Harris
IV. The Knowledge that is in Instinct W. D. Lighthall
V. Reviews of Books.
A. S. Eddington, The Nature of the Physical World: by Arthur
E. Murphy
—
Hugo Dingier, Metaphysik als Wissenschaft vom
Letzten: by Charles W. Morris
—
7-licohi Hartmann, Die Phih
osophie des deutschen Idealismus, Bd. II, Hegel: by Henry Lan^
—
Edward Scrihner Ames, Religion: by Alban G. Widgery
—
Mary
Mills Patrick,, The Greek Sceptics: by Richard Robinson
—
Seha
Eldridge, The New Citizenship: by T. V. Smith
—
7<lorinan Kemp
Smith (translator), Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason:
by G. Watts Cunningham
—
Andre Lalande, Les theories de Tinduc-
tion et de Texperimentation : by H. R. Smart
—
E. S. Brightman, A
Philosophy of Ideals: by B. C. Holt2;claw, Jr.
—
Mary Evelyn
Clar\e, A Study in the Logic of Value: by Norman Wilde
Fred B. R. Hellems, The Kings Market; B. F. Wright, Jr., A
Source Book of American Political Theory; and W. E. Hoc\ing,
Human Nature and its Re-making: by H. G. Townsend.
VI. Notes.
PUBLISHED BI-MONTHLY
LONGMANS, GREEN, AND COMPANY
LANCASTER, PA.
55 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK
SINGLE NUMBERS $1.00 (58.). PER ANNUM $5.00 (258).
Mt—«»—M m n II ^n^nmmmn II II Ilium w m il m n m tt m n i ii ii i im ii i« •
The Open Court
X'ulumo XLIV (Xo. 10) OCTOBER. 1930 Xumher SUJ
TAin.l-: (JF cox TEXTS
PACK
l-'nnitlspu'Ci'. i'i.( »ki.\.\ rAjdui.
Limitations of Science as a System of Belief.
T. SWAXX U AKDIXC 577
Indian !'liilosop!i\ in its Pii'duience Froni the S/^irit of the
Conteniporarx U'esl. i-dwakd i.. sciFArr, 3S(i
The Lo:\\< of the Penuuis. m \.\i m ii.i \\ kidwin 5'^''
Occidental Martha. i.i.dVD mokris ()2()
Carl Sanhuro- .In .Inieriean l/onier. j. \". x \sii ()^^
I'lorian Ca/ori. ix m f.moki am ()4(i
Pul)li->hcd monthly by
THE OPEX C(JEKr I T'lUTSHEXG COMI'AXV
337 ha>t Cliicago Aseiuu-
Chicago. I Hindis
.S"n/».V('ri7>/io» rate.'; ; $2.00 a year : 20c a copy. Rcmiitaiicfs may be made
by personal checks, drafts, post-office or express money orders, payable to tlie
Open Court Publishing Company. Chicago.
While the publishers do not hold themselves responsible tor manu-
scripts sent to them, they endeavor to use the greatest care in returning
those not found available, if postage is sent. As a precaution against loss.
mistakes, or dela^-. they request that the name and address of the author
be placed at the head of every manuscript (and not on a separate slip) and
that all manuscripts and correspondence concerning them be addressed
to the Open Court Publishing Company and not to individuals.
Address all correspondence to the Open Court Publishing Company. 337
East Chicago Ave.. Chicago.
Entered as Second-Class matter March 26. 1897, at the Post Office at Chicago, Illinoi.s,
under Act of March 3. 1879.
Copyright by The Opi-n Court Publishing C(uiipany. 1930.
Printed in the United States of .\merica.
+.
—
THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY PRESS
Announces
LOGIC AND NATURE
By Marie C. Swabey, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor of Philosophy
in New York Universitv'
TO vindicate logic as the method of metaphysics and to show
its apph'cability to current problems of science and nature,
is the purpose of this volume. This involves a demonstration
of the priority of logic to experience and a discussion of the
nature of reason. Hypothetical judgments, non-syllogistic
arguments, the paradoxes of Russell, the relation of the form
and matter of inference, the nature of postulational systems,
the problem of truth, and the theory of universals are among
the logical topics considered. Nature is held to be inter-
preted by science in the light of a set of logical assumptions.
In this connection, probability is shown to be the basis of in-
duction, and atomism an indispensable methodological presup-
position of science. It is urged that measurement is an opera-
tion of rational comparison; while a logical interpretation is also
offered of the appearance of seemingly irreversible statistical
tendencies and laws in nature.
"A strong case lor the priiiiordia'.ity ot logic."—Professor Cassius J.
Kcyser, Columbia University
"Marked by a fine capacity for logical analysis and reasoning.
. .
.
It holds the attention continually. "'- -Professor Rt)bert MacDougall.
"The book is founded on a detailed, lucid, and convincing criti'
cism of naturalism. Its positive thesis ... is closely and vigorously
argued. The book is written in a style unusual lor its clarity and
brevity, and reveals the wide reading of its author in classical and in
contemporary modern philosophy."—Professor Mary Whiton Calkins.
8vo, x-iv -}- 384 ^ages. Bound in blue cloth, gold-lettered. Price $4.00.
For Sale By
THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING CO.






This periodical is the organ of active philosophical dis-
j
cussion in the United States. There is no similar iournal in 1
the field of scientific philosophy. It is issued iortnighth'
j
and permits the quick publication of short contributions,
j
prompt reviews and timely discussions. i
Edited hy Professors F. J. E. Woodhridge, j
W. r. Bush, and H. \V. Schneider, I
of Columbia University j
515 WEST 116TH STREET, NEW YORK
The Open Court Publishing Company
337 East Chicago Avenue Chicago, III.











The Revolt Against Dualism
j
By ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY
|
Professor of Philosophy in the Johns Hopkins University |
I Is dualism—the concept of subjective appearance and objective !
j reality—a "passed mode, an outworn theme"? Or is it the corner stone I
j of the new physics? Is Descartes dethroned or is -his sovereignty vin- j
j dicated in the light of modern philosophy? Do the results of scientific j
research justify or overthrow the old ideas of dualism of mind and
j
j
matter? ^ This last quarter century will have distinctive interest to
1 future historians of philosophy as the age of the great revolt against 1
1 dualism, a phase of the wider revolt of the 20th against the 17th 1
j centur>'. Dr. Lovejoy traces this revolt, brilliantly analyzing modern 1
i
scientiiic philosophy, in a lucid, penetrating volume necessary to an j
I
adequate understanding of philosophy's most important problem.
j
j Price ^4.00 j
I
y t / i-'.aer i niracrn /A\7<>niio i r\ir^(Tr\ iii
AMERICAN MATHEMATICAL SOCIETY
COLLOQUIUM SERIES
I'uMi^hf.l ill .\l;i>-. ly.K):
Dunham Jackson, The Theory of .Xiqin ixiniatii mi. AIm.uI 2(HJ jip. $2.50.
.
iXOlunu' XI of thf Colli Kjuiiim Scries.)
EARLIER VOLUMES
\ olumc I. l.iin.;ir Syslcins of Lurxo mi Al^^elnaic Siuf;uH-v. l»y
H. S. White; Forms of Non-Euclidean Sjiacc. \>\ F. S. Woods;
Selected Topics in the Tlieory of i)i\eri.;ent Series and of Con-
tinued Fractions, 1)\" E. B. Van Vleck. ( T.oston Collo(|ninm.
)
New York. 1905. $2.75.
\'oluinc IT. New I fax en Collo([uiuin. \<y E. H. Moore, E. J. Wil-
czynski, and Max Mason. Out of inint.
\ tiluine III. Fundamental Existence Tlicorenis. l)y G. A. Bhss ; ! >if
ferential-Cicoinetric Aspects of l)\naniics. by Edward Kasner.
(Princeton Collixiuium. ) New \'ork. lOl.V $2.50.
\ (ihune 1\. (hi Inxariants and the Theory of XTunl)ers. by L. E.
Dickson; To])ics in the Theory of ['"unctions of Several C'om])lcx
X'ariables. 1)\' W. F. Osgood. (.Madison Collo([uium. ) New York,
ic»14. $2.50."
\Olume \ . Fart 1. h'unctiouals and llieir Ai)]ilications. .'^elected Top-
ics, includiui.;' ]ntei.iral k",(piations. b\ G. C. Evans. New \'ork,
1918. $2.00.^
\"oluine \'. I'art 1 1. Aiial_\ sis Silu^, 1>\ Oswald Veblen. < )ut of ]M-int.
\ olunie \l. ddie Los^arithmii' I'otciuial. 1 )i>contiriuous l)iriidi]et
and Neumann l'roblem>. 1)\ G. C. Evans, New ^'ork, 1*'27. $2.00.
\ olume \ 11. .\lue])raic Arithmetic. b\ E. T. Bell. New \'ork. 1<)27.
$2.50.
X'olume \ 111. Non-Kiemannian (ieometrx, b\ L. P. Eisenhart. .New
^'ork, 1Q27. $2..50.
X'olume IX. ! )\ nanucal S\stcm>. 1)\ G. D. Birkhoff. Xew X'ork,
1Q27. $.100.'
\ (ilume X. .Mt^ebraic ( icometrx and Theta ITmctions. 1)\ A. B. Coble.
Xew ^'ork! 1929. $.^.00.
( )rders ma\ be si'iit to tlie .\merican Matliematical Societx",
501 West ll()tli Street, Xew ^'ork City, or to 1
THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY !
337 East Chicago Avenue Chicago, Illinois; 1
—+





J^otations in Elementary Mathematics
Vol. II—l^lotations Mainly in Higher Mathematics
Price, Cloth, ^6.00 each
"The lirst volume deals with the history of notations from the days of the
aneients and hy nations as far apart as the Babylonians and the A::tees, Egyp-
tians and Chinese, Arabs, Germans, Italians and English. The second volume
gives a history of the symbols that have accompanied the great advance ot
mathematics from the days of Newton to the present times.
"Professor Cajori's book will be indispensable to the historian ot mathe-
m.itics."—The Times Literary Supplement, London.
"The amount of research that this work represents is extraordinary and
the histt)r)- will be of great usefulness to mathematicians."- -/ouriitil oj tiie
American Institute of Electrical Engineers.





HANS VAIHINGER, JOSEPH PETZOLDT
IX I)
RAYMUND SCHMIDT
.Vbonnemenlspreis fiir den iin lu-scheinen begriffenen Baud I'llI : Jahrlich
ein r.and von 10 Heften. RM 20.~~
Die Zeitschrift dient keiner phil()Sophi>c]ien ."-^chule. Sie beruck>ichtigt
in erster Linie die lleitrage zur phil()soi)hisc]ien i'roblematik, icclcJic V(Ui
den Ein.zclwissoischaficu aitS(/clicii. Sie ist die einzige philosophische
Zeitschrift, die nicht lediglich \on I'achphilo.^ophen redigiert wird, son-
dern irissciiscliaftlcr allcr Gcbictc cii Mithcrau.s-i/rbcni und Mitarhcifcni
hat.—Am Schluss jedes Hefts ein
Literaturbericht
der in systeniatisch geordneten Einzelreferaten, unter Zuriick.^tellung von
W'erlurteilen, uher den Inhalt der Xeuerscheinungen berichtet und bib-
lio(/rapln.<cIu' I 'oUstaJidiokcif an^irebt. I*"Jn I'robeheft \-ersendet uin.^onst
und ])(istfrei
FELIX MEINER VERLAG IN LEIPZIG C 1,
Kurzestr. 8.
tftt —




Professor of Mathematics, Dartmouth College
Price, ^2.00
Projective Geometry may be approached by various routes; postulational
or intuitive, synthetic or analytic, metric or purely projective. In a mono-
graph which is to give a first approach to the subject it has seemed to me
that the treatment should be based on intuition, should develop the sub'
ject by synthetic methods, and should keep projective properties sharply
distinguished from the metric specializations. The reader will accordingly
find in the first five chapters a systematic and thoroughly elementary treat-
ment of the most fundamental propositions of projective geometry, cul-
minating in the theorems of Pascal and Brianchon and the polar system
of a conic. My purpose in these chapters has been to develop on an intui-
tive basis the concepts and the properties of projective space, without any
admixture of metric ideas. Only in this way, I believe, can the reader




Chancellor Arnold Buffum Ch.-\cl, of Brown University, is render-
ing signal honor to the M.athematic.al Assoclation of America by pub-
lishing under its auspices his Rhind Mathematical Papyrus.
Volume I, over 200 pages (ll|/4"x8"), contains the free Translation,
Commentary, and Bibliography of Egyptian Mathematics.
Volume II, 140 plates (llJ/^'^xH") in two colors with Text and Introduc-
tions, contains the Photographic Facsimile, Hieroglyphic Transcription, Trans-
literation, and Literal Translation.
This exposition of the oldest mathematical document in the world will be









l-rontispicce to The Open Court.
The Open Court
A MONTHLY MAGAZINE
Devoted to the Science of Religion, the Religion of Science, an«l
the Extension of the Religious Parliament Idea.
COPYRIGHT BY OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY 1930
Volume XLIV (No. 10) OCTOBER. 1930 Number 893
LIMITATIONS OF SCIENCE AS A SYSTEM OF BELIEF
BY T. SWANN HARDING
ABSTRACT science and philosophy seem subjects very rt-mote
from ordinary hfe. Actually they are not so at all. (lenera-
tions of very ordinar\- men have heroically grappled with the
problem of immortalit\', with that of a personal or impersonal
creative intelligence, with that of what we should do now that we
are here, and with other metaphysical enigmas about which scientists
and philosophers argue in stupendous polysyllables, and about which
they actually know almost as little as ordinary people. The inven-
tion of an impressive nomenclature has undoubtedly given them a
feeling of erudition as a protective cloak, but they know so little that
a highly intelligent man was recently heard to declare that the
most important problem men faced today was whether life had any
definite purpose, whether we have a life after death, and whether
there is a god—to lump several closely related problems into one.
Consider this picture. A housewife awoke one morning in her
sleeping-porch overlooking the back yard. The apple tree was a
mass of white blossoms. The grass had just become thoroughly
green. The scent of spring was in the air, and the birds were twit-
tering vociferously. But. just as likely as not, she thought, the}-
were swearing at each other. She should arise. Yet why should
she arise ? There were two animals, cat and dog, which now im-
periously demanded her attention. There were no children who
might have constituted a "duty."" But would they have been a really
important duty? Even they might reach maturity as a negligible
clerk or a silly eternal flapper. But she should hang the front room
curtains anew and get another china cabinet. Why should she?
Having done that there would be that much less to do.
It was not so always. Some years ago, as a trained nurse, she
had been kept very busy. She had never meditated on the futility
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of her existence in her life, vmtil after marriage gave her leisure.
She was happier then than now .... she was serving. How was
she serving? She was helping to save and to preserve human
lives. . . . \\^ere they worth preserving
—
pimply youths and moron
flappers ? P'robabl}' not. Obviously not. 1 he problem seemed in-
volved.
Anywa}', she could serve now through her husband, lie worked
in a laboratory- and did what some people called wonderful things.
He lectured and he wrote, instructing the people. Yet .... the\
were the same kind of more or less useless people she had served
when nursing. That was all that service to humanity was; that is
all that big reputations of artists, writers, orators, statesmen, are built
upon—the ardent devotion of large masses of people whose intellects
the great would tind individually repulsive and whose habits, customs
and ideas would undoubtedly offend them in personal contact. Yet
upon their silly plaudits the "great" live. There wasn't so much to
that.
Wasn't it probable that her husband had an itch to produce an
article, or to complete a bit of research, just as she had an itch to
purchase a new china closet or to hang new curtain.s—merely to
opiate that curious and indescribable "underneath all" feeling which
told you you were old, which told you you were going to die soon,
which told you life was a sort of joke, which told you that even the
earth would eventually grow cold and lifeless, and that this local
jest of sentient life here—a very rare and unusual occurrence at best
—would cease, the gods (were there gods?—silly idea) would laugh,
and all would be as it had been before chaos became orderly a
moment in one of the tinier and least important suburban universes.
What could you believe about it all anyway? Why nothing!
So the housewife turned over and went to sleep again and she
slept until noon. Then she still felt miserable so she went out and
bought a new hat, which gets somewhat outside the territory of
metaphysics and does not exactly concern us here. Certain it is
that every person with any intellectual pretentions whatever has been
prey to these same questionings. That is all that does concern us
here.
What we have discovered is, then, that the common individual is
no more free from metaphysical ideas than the philosopher and, sec-
ondly, that purely rational explanations will not carry as far as
certain t)pes of naturalism might led us to think. Hu.sband and
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wife both, in very different ways, diverted themselves ; in so far as
the result was pleasurable to them their lives were successful and
that essentially selfish criterion is the only one by which we can
really judge. Our activities may be complex and intricate : they
may seem to have very considerable significance in a decidedly
limited manner, but push am- activity to the ultimate limit and }ou
come, as you do in all deeper philosophic thought, to complete
skepticism and a conviction of utter futility.
At responsible intellectual levels diversion may well be para-
mount, for it is socially quite safe to have an intelligent man divert
himself as he will. It is assumed, of course, that his emotions as well
as his mind are educated ; it is freely granted that there exist today
hundreds of highly intelligent people whose emotional immaturity
renders them socially far more dangerous than morcjns or near-
imbeciles. That is natural because w'e devote little attention in our
educational system to emotional discipline ; in fact, to suggest dis-
cipline is somehow subtly unpatriotic anywa}'.
Thus when John Haldane Blackie assayed the American system
of education in "Reviewed by a Briton" in The Ildncatioiuil Re-
view for October, 1928. he noted that while English students ac-
cepted discipline as an unalterable fact of nature, and while their
student prefects dared not give cause for rebellion, in America
schools have entirely too little discipline. He continued "The .\meri-
can boy at his synthetic w(jrst is conceited, ill-mannered, and without
any sense of responsibility."' Also, "It is only necessary to compare
the police methods of England and America, and the almost total
absence of 'graft' in the former .... to see that discipline is not
merely a fad, or a tradition, whose sole merit lies in its wdiiskers.''
At lower intellectual levels, how^ever, the discipline of social
regimentation is really necessary because intelligent self-discipline
is impossible whether the emotions be mature or not. But Ethelbert
Stewart, United States Commissioner of Labor Statistics, recentl\-
explained how very usefvd, socially and economically, the feeble
minded can become when handled intelligently {Monthly Labor
Rcviezv, July, 1928). This again involves scientifically controlled
discipline by social pressure such as prevails, it is reliably reported,
in the new schools of Soviet Russia, where the idea of beating up a
student to make him obey has become actually grotesque. This
discipline should always be accompanied by interesting and time-
consuming tasks and fixed beliefs. It is especially the lack of the
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latter these modern days that has done so much to upset our civiUza-
tion and give it a criminally chaotic aspect. Intellect is no more
radical than it has always been, but lower levels of intelligence have
hitherto been shielded from these strong mental brews, perfectly
safe to quench the thirst of strong minds, by the fact that they have
been uneducated and largely inarticulate.
This is an era of free education. The conquest of illiteracy is
our high ideal. AMiether or not minds and emotions are disciplined,
every one must be able to read and write, and this leads to vehement
articulation on the part of classes unaccustomed to be articulate in
the past. The always dubious and skeptical ideas of the true intelli-
gentsia also much more rapidly filter down to lower levels todav
than in the past ; it is then assumed at those levels that the organized
world has gone to the dogs—for though these radical beliefs are
centuries old. they have never before been so clearly apprehended
b\- those of moderate intelligence ; therefore the old, fixed, tradi-
tional beliefs of the masses are no longer respected by them, and
we ha\e the widespread criminalit\' and disrespect for social sta-
bility now rampant as a very natural consequence.
The true intellectual of culture can safely have fluid beliefs ; he
can be very skeptical, because such people have the personal sense of
\alues to know that hypothetical beliefs should not control their
actions ; when they act they follow facts, whatever their momentar}
beliefs. On lower levels of intelligence, however, beliefs actually
do condition acts. The only way out is. then, for the intellectual
minority to condition the beliefs of the masses in such a way that
they can act upon their beliefs to the greatest good of society as a
whole. The ordinary man can not be skeptical and entertain fluid
beliefs or indulge in suspended judgment without becoming abso-
lutely unreliable as a citizen.
The true intellectual, like the great scientist for instance, can
entertain these fluid beliefs which, like the fundamentals underlying
science as well as religion, rest ultimately upon absolutely nothing,
save a common assumption accepted as axiomatic, just as he accepts
the polite conventions of society or the more delicate nuances of
etiquette. He knows that his ultimate beliefs do not require proof,
though he may have considerable faith in the temporary logical
structure he rears upon them. This structure is a product of pure
rationalism, a rationalism more pure than it is possible to use in the
LIMITATION'S OF SCIKXCK 581
construction of an}- religion, yet, like religion, it rests finalK uj)on
pre-rational or non-rational assumptions.
These beliefs of the true intellectual, then, rest ultimately upon
nothing save an assumption. This assumption does not require
proof ; it is accepted as axiomatic. Tt is like those propositions early
in Euclid upon which the entire fascinating structure of his logical
geometry is built. It just is—whether it be Creator or L^nknowable,
Creative Intelligence or the Law of Universal Causation ; whethei-
God or Absolute, it just is. It ma}- momentaril}-, and in a specific
emotional state, appear to be supported b}- an astute selection of ap-
posite facts, but that is all you can sa}- for it, and the true intellectual
may be assa}-ed by the fact that he actually knows when he has
begun to rationalize ex post facto in order to buttress a belief he
finds comfortable per sc. •
On the other hand, as we haxe ^een, the masses vastl\- need dis-
ci])line today. In the pursuit of the democratic ideal we have gone
too far. It is (|uite true that the sort of discipline the nobilitv and
royalty of one or two centuries past exacted from the masses had
grown obsolete. It needed to be discarded. Hut the extreme demo-
cratic idea, the idea that one man is as good as another and, if poor
and hard-working enough, a great deal better, has led the world to
assume that no discipline at all is necessary. Yet during these \-er\
years science was rising to ofifer the newer and better discipline the
intellectual minority should apply to the masses. However, it has
remained rather well secluded in laboratories and behind wall> even
until today, and mass discipline is still attacked, if at all, with the
anachronistic weapons of antiquated creeds, exploded philosophic
notions and traditional moral concepts.
What the masses need today is a system of metaph}sica] beliefs
which trained biologists and psychologists could certainl\- fashion
for them. Science is recreant to its plain duty to societ\- until sucli
an attempt is made, and it will well deserve the antagonism of, and
perhaps ultimate annihilation by, ignorant mass notions unless it
girds itself to attack this problem. It is well enough to know the
finer points of therap}- or nutrition and to be involved in long re-
searches upon lower animals, but the most important problem con-
fronting science is that of so controlling society, the great mass of
men, that science may pursue its humane studies and apply them
to that society without disastrous interference from the very people
it desires to help. This means simply that the paramount dutv of
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science is to fashion beliefs for the masses and to disciphne them
into these beUefs so that ordinary men ma}' again attack tasks com-
mensurate with their inteUigence, while resting in the protection and
the sharp discipline of beliefs they can accept as final. Scientists
can then also pursue their researches unmolested b\- recalcitrant
mass values.
This new mass religion cannot be Science itself, however much
the masses appear today to want to make it Science. Quite ordinary
])eople today set up Science as a criterion of value even in religion;
if it can be made to support a religious idea, that idea becomes more
true; if not, the idea is weakened or Science must change^ which is
unfortunate for Science. Modern advertising and reading matter
in the popular magazines make it more and more apparent that
Science does tend to 'become the "New Messiah" for laymen in
general. lUit it will really not do at all. It will not do because it
admits, privatel}' at least, that it rests ultimately upon purely non-
rational assumptions which just are. A religion may be very logical
in its superstructure but it never admits that its foundatin is non-
rational ; its foundation is super- rational because laid by Omniscience
and (Omnipotence and that is essential to religion. Science says,
well here we are at the foundation; it just is; let us build up a
beautiful edifice. Religion sa}s here is the unchanging foundatioii
wliich God, the ( )mniscient. has ordained as perfect and absolute
from everlasting to everlasting; let us build upon it this or that
])rett}' edifice; whatever it may liecome in the end the foundation is
sure and absolutel}' final.
Science is, of course, merel}' a system of belief expressed dog-
matical]}'. l>ut it is a system of belief for the intellectual minorit}',
not for the masses. It differs from religion soleh' in its attitude
towards its ultimate princi[)les, but those ])rinciples remain simpi}'
assumptions, like the religious assumptions. Science, however, ad-
mits they are assumptions; it does not affect to regard them as final
rt'xelations. Science assumes, for instance, that if we observe and
experiment we can find nature's laws by summarizing enough par-
ticulars. That is an assumption. For observation and experiment
have certainly ])roduced as many false as true beliefs. We could
never ])r()ve that that assumption is rationally sound. It just is and
from that science proceeds on its way. In similar manner it assumes
uni\ersal causation and regularity of performance in natural law.
hi it- as^iimi)ti()ns about cause and effect it is u|) against a non-
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rational principle which just is in the universe, and in its adoration
of consistency aiid regularity of nature's performance—the idea
that the sun will arise tomorrow because it did yesterday and that
a miracle cannot happen because of nature's law— it is simplv mak-
ing further assumptions.
A comedian sitting at the piano once said, "I will now play this
piece just as Paderewski would play it if he pla}ed it just as I am
going to play it." and that is somewhat the standpoint of science.
We see the moon and it is the "real" moon which has sent its ra}s
to our retinas; quite so, but wh}- ? We see a ghost just as surely
and yet it is not a ghost ; it may have sent its rays to our retinas
surely enough but it is not a ghost because science says there is no
such thing as a ghost. We must continually make such assumptions.
We may say likewise that Christ, and twelve or fourteen saints after
him. did not make water into wine because science savs ( uni-
formitx' of the operation of nature's laws ) this cannot be done.
Vet science devised these laws b\' summarizing particular phe-
nomena ; it does not even pretend to be able to prove anv law ab-
solutely because it is utterly impossible for it to ascertain every
single particular in any single case. \\ h\- not allow for a miracle
here or there, among the unsummarized particulars? There is no
rational reason. It just isn't done. Science is dogmatic about such
things.
\\ hy not a Creator as well as a I'niversal First Cause or an
L'nknowable ? There is no real reason. Science simi)l\- does not
make use of that assumption nor does it need that assum]ition in
its work. What is the essential utilitv of the doctrine of the uni-
formity of natural law other than as a club for a theologian's
head when he appears with a miracle in his hand? A\'hv is em-
pirical knowledge drawn from observation and experience of more
\alue than intuitive knowledge which just comes t(j us and tells us
it is Truth? There is no real reason for these things. Science
simply agrees to accept and be guided b\' the one and to reiect the
other as unreliable. And, in the intellectual system of belief called
.Science ( the true intellectuals of t(jday tend more and more to hold
this belief in its best form) intuitive knowledge is not needed very
much.
There is s(jme confusion, of course, when the physicist meets
the psychologist and the former sa}s "All is mechanical cause and
effect," to which the latter replies "All is the subjective action of
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our minds upon what appear to be external phenomena." But it i?
possible to fuse even such divergences into a sort of oneness for
study as a whole, especial!}- these days when physics becomes more
and more amenable to mental mouUlinj^. For Lord Haldane's final
article in The Century for December, 1928, said this, amonjj other
things : that Einstein has taught us time and space are ultimately
nothing more than relations established between the mind and the
things it observes, and that these relations vary according to the
velocity of the observing mind. Hence we are driven back to
mind even in physics ; outside mind there is nothing, and ajiart from
it, nothing has any meaning.
\\ h\', we ma\' ask for example, a theor\ of exolution .^ "Well, it
rests upon scientific method, upon observation and experience."
Upon what do these rest ? O you must assume something. l'>ut
observation and experience, even in the theory of evolution, have
now and then produced wrong ideas or beliefs, have they not? "( >
\es, of course." Then which of \'our present beliefs are incorrect.'
"It is reall\' impossible to say just which ma\ be found wholly or
in part erroneous after further investigation, but we certainly be-
lieve that progress \\\\\ hnall\- round the theor\- into a completely
acceptable and true doctrine, and we hold just as certainly that the
scientific method will lead us rightly in the future as in the i)ast. ' lUii
}OU have admitted that your fundamental assumptions are just as-
sumptions, they do not rest upon scientific method, then. You have
admitted that this scientific method has at times produced erroneous
beliefs in }'our restricted field. How do \o\\ know that }our de-
pendence upon scientific method and )()ur belief in progress are
not among the erroneous beliefs? "Well, we have no reason to think
so and, as 1 said, we must assume something." .\11 right; assume
that your theory of evolution has become an absolutely true thing,
then what ? It is then an absolute doctrine in which every one must
believe. It no longer rests upon facts, phenomena, observation,
experience, or scientific method; it just /,s',' it is an axiom and has
wiped away its foundation in becoming the perfect thing \ou ho|)ed
I)rogress would make it. What then ?
Logically and rationally there is nothing then. I'he tlieory of
evolution like all other scientific theories is vulnerable to such basic
rational treatment. Lltimatel}' it just is. Science offers a fine,
logical, useful system of belief ; it has especial attraction for people
of active intellects and self-disciplined emotions. It suit-^ them a>
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a more metaphysical or religious system of belief never could, and
it also has more practical utilit}' than such systems. But it is noth-
ing more nor less than another system of belief founded upon cer-
tain fundamental assumptions, and to claim more for it. is to as-
sume an arrogance no scientist should ever assume.
Coming back to where we started, then, we each and every one
of us adopt a scale of values and a s} stem of belief that seems com-
fortable to us. We essentially believe what it makes us feel good to
believe tand we indulge in those activities which most completely
satisfy us. Despite our pretenses that is the real fact of the matter.
These particular beliefs somehow protect us as individuals from
the awfulness of complete doubt or intellectual chaos. They give
us something to tie to. some point at which to >tart. some founda-
tion upon which to rear a dwelling for our minds. The}' save us
from a sense of utter futility. For we all have orderl\- minds in a
frightfully disorderly universe and the onl_\ order the universe has
is that with which our minds invest it. If we want a section of the
universe pleasingly orderl\- we must synthesize this order mentall\
.
It is in some such sense that Santavana meant that miracles had
more reason than scientific laws, for the\- implied the very humanl\
comprehensible and reasonable desire of a beneficent father-god to
see that we, his children, were protected and aidetl, whereas indif-
ferent natural law simpl}- was. What Santayana forgot was that
God simply is also, if you place him as your foundation instead of
some other non-rational assumption.
A system of social order should then be planned by those who
think, and it should be planned so attractively that the beliefs
evolved above (speaking intellectually now) for those below will
discipline those below, while at the same time giving them the feel-
ing of free will and independence. This means that culture and
humanism must be added to science ; that Goethe and Shakespeare
and Beethoven must take their places beside Newton, Kelvin and
Einstein. Science must learn to see life wholly; to temper its most
cherished beliefs with a tinge of skepticism, to seek diversion and
content rather than certitude and finality, and so to control minds
of the l(^wer intellectual orders that their discipline ma\- make our
entire society more happ_\' and more stable than it is at ])re>ent.
